A Great Business Isn't a Great Investment at the Wrong Price or Wrong Terms

如果价格或者条件不合适，那大公司也不是好的投资之选

We spend a lot of time talking about the various traits of a good business - high returns on equity, little or no debt, franchise value, a shareholder friendly management, etc.

我们花了大量时间讨论好的投资产品的多种特点：股本收益高、基本没有债务、特许权价值、对股东有益的管理等等。

Although Charlie Munger's dictum, "it's far better to buy a good business at a fair price rather than a fair business a great price" is true, it is important for you to realize that good results are not likely to be had by those that buy such stocks regardless of price.

虽然查理·芒格说的“以相对公平的价格买下好的投资产品要好于以高昂价格买下一个相对公平的投资产品”是对的，但对你来说，懂得不考虑价格就买这样的股票也不一定会有好的收益，这一点很重要。

It's a fine distinction, but one that can mean the difference between good results and disastrous losses. At least, not within a short period of time.

这是细微的差别，但它指的是高收益和灾难性损失之间的区别。至少短期内是这样的。

Back in the late 1960's, Wall Street became enthralled with a group of stocks dubbed The Nifty Fifty. Perhaps the online encyclopedia Wikipedia sums it up best, "[These stocks] had everything going for them - brand names, patents, top management, spectacular sales, and solid profits.

回顾20世纪60年代末期，华尔街迷上了一批称为Nifty Fifty的股票，可能网络百科全书Wikipedia总结得最到位“这些股票有所有让你买下的理由：大牌、专利、高层管理人员、可观的销售额和稳定的利润。

They were thought to be best stocks to buy them and hold them for the long run, and that was all you needed to do.

人们认为这些是可以买下并长期持有的最好的股票，你只需买下就好。

These were the stocks 'dreams' were made of ...for the long haul to retire with."

这些是做梦都想买的股票，可以长期持有，退休有它就够了。”

The fatal flaw in this logic is that investors believed that these companies - enterprises such as Eastman Kodak and Xerox - were so inherently good that they could (and should) be bought at any price. Of course, this is simply not the case.

这一逻辑的致命缺陷就是投资者认为这些公司如柯达公司和施乐太好了，以什么价格都能（而且应该）买入，当然事实并非如此。

Although a stock trading at a high p/e ratio isn't always overpriced, more often than not, a stock trading at a price-to-earnings ratio of 60x is almost assuredly going to generate a rate of return less than that of a so-called "risk-free" U.S. Treasury bond.

虽然以高市盈率交易的股票并非总是价格偏高，但往往以60x的市盈率交易的股票产生的回报率的确会低于所谓的“无风险”美国国债。

What makes this discussion complicated is:

导致这一问题复杂化的因素是：

First, many inexperienced investors fail to realize that, even though companies like Eastman Kodak went bankrupt, long-term investors still should have walked away with a lot more wealth than they had prior to their investment.  

首先，很多缺乏经验的投资者没有意识到即使像柯达这样的公司破产了，长期投资者仍然可以带着比投资之前赚到的更多的钱转移资金。

This can be difficult to grasp if you aren't aware of how dividends, spin-offs, split-off, and even tax loss credits work but it is, nevertheless, the case.

如果你不懂股息、剥离、分拆，甚至抵税是如何操作的，那这个很难掌握，但事实仍然并非如此。

Second, for 20 to 30 years after the Nifty Fifty peaked, the basket of stocks, as a whole, underperformed the market.  

其次，Nifty Fifty火爆之后的20-30年间，股票篮子整体市场表现不佳。

However, by the time you started getting into the 30 to 40-year range, the underlying businesses were, in fact, so good that they ultimately ended up beating the market as the core economic engines were so superior they burned off the excess valuation.

然而你买了30-40年之后，这个潜在的投资产品其实也很好，最终能战胜股市，因为核心经济引擎太好了，能消耗掉过剩价值。

Not only that, but the Nifty Fifty would have had better tax efficiency than an index fund. When dealing with excellent businesses, the ghost ship approach, historically, has won in the long-run but how many investors are willing to stick with 30 or 40 years of near total passivity in a lifetime that, for most people, will last only 80 years or so? Again, it's an issue for behavioral economics.

不仅如此，Nifty Fifty比指数基金的税收效益更好，从历史角度来看“幽灵船”的方法针对好的投资产品具有长期优势，但有多少投资者愿意一辈子几乎完全被动地等上30或40年呢？大多数人只能活80岁左右。再强调一下，这是行为经济学的问题。

All else equal, though, try and avoid investments that are priced to perfection with no margin of safety because a mere blip in operating performance could cause a long-term, catastrophic loss in principal as fickle speculators flee to hotter securities.

然而其他的都一样，你要尽量避免定价完美但利润没有保证的投资，因为操作时的一点波动，都会对本金造成长期的巨大损失，因为变化无常的投机者会转向更热门的证券市场。

Even then, if you are going to consider it, stick solely to the bluest of the blue chips. You can probably get away with overpaying for a company like Johnson & Johnson if you're going to hold it for the next 50 years - nobody knows the future but the odds seem to favor it - whereas I wouldn't be so keen on doing it for a firm like Facebook.

尽管如此，如果你想，你还可以坚持只投蓝筹股中最稳定的，强生这种公司的股票如果你在手里存50年也能避免花冤枉钱，谁也不能预测未来，但胜算还是有的，否则我也不会热衷于长期持有脸书这样的公司的股票。